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A DISSONANCE THEORY EXPLANATION FOR VISUAL FLIGHT RULES (VFR)
INTO INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IMC) ACCIDENTS
Steven Henderson
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Gatineau, Quebec, Canada
In the U.S. in 2008, accidents resulting from VFR flight into IMC accounted for
2% of all general aviation (GA) accidents, but 8% of all fatal GA accidents.
Furthermore, 88% of VFR into IMC accidents were fatal, compared to 17% of
other aviation accidents. Dissonance theory is a model of attitude change
associated with making difficult choices. Attitude change reduces cognitive
dissonance arising from favourable aspects of a not-chosen alternative and
unfavourable aspects of a chosen alternative, through spreading of alternatives.
Under dissonance theory, pilots in marginal weather who repeatedly revisit their
choice to either continue their flight or divert to an alternate destination
progressively distort their perception of weather conditions, making them more
likely to commit decision-making errors leading to VFR into IMC accidents.
Many aspects of general aviation are consistent with factors that increase
spreading of alternatives. Dissonance theory resolves inconsistent results from
simulator-based studies of weather decision-making.
Visual flight rule (VFR) flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) is a significant causal
factor in general aviation (GA) accidents involving fixed-wing aircraft under 12,500 pounds maximum takeoff
weight (MTW) in the United States, accounting for 2% of all GA accidents, but 8% of all fatal GA accidents. These
accidents are disproportionately lethal. In 2008, 22 of the 25 VFR into IMC accidents were fatal, for a fatality rate of
88% compared to the 17% fatality rate of all other GA accidents.
Canadian VFR into IMC accident statistics are similar. Between 1995 and 2004, the Transportation Safety
Board of Canada identified 80 aviation occurrences as VFR into IMC accidents. Although VFR into IMC accidents
comprised only 2.5% of the 3,256 accidents involving Canadian-registered aircraft in that period, they comprised
12% of all fatal accidents, and took 96 lives (14% of all aviation fatalities). Furthermore, 55% of VFR-into-IMC
accidents were fatal, compared to 10% of all other accidents involving private pilots.
Despite a substantial number of
communications, tools and countermeasures
training offered by the FAA, the NTSB, the
AOPA and others to GA pilots regarding VFR
into IMC accidents, these accidents continue
almost unabated. Figure 1 (U.S. accident data
from AOPA ASF database of NTSB data
through 2008, flight hours from AOPA 2008
and 2009 NALL Reports) shows only a small
but statistically significant decrease in the US
VFR into IMC accident rate for GA aircraft
under 12,500 lbs MTW (R2 = .439, p = .037),
and no significant decrease in the fatal VFR into
IMC accident rate (R2 = .218, p = .17).
Figure 1. Total and Fatal VFR into IMC Accident Rates

Simulator Research on Cognitive Models of Weather Decision-Making
Wiegmann, O’Hare, Goh and others have conducted a substantial body of pilot decision-making research
using simulated cross-country flights (Goh and Wiegmann, 2001a, 2001b; O’Hare and Smitheram, 1995; O’Hare
and Wiegmann 2003; Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare, 2001, 2002). They have suggested that a number of “failures at
different stages of the decisional process” lead to VFR into IMC accidents. Several categories of human information
processing factors and models that have been proposed and/or tested for VFR into IMC accidents are:



Situation assessment. Inaccurate assessments of weather conditions. To counter this factor, Wiggins and
O’Hare (2003) developed the “WeatherWise” computer-based training program for the FAA. The training
program incorporates pictures and video clips to train pilots to identify critical weather cues during flight.
The AOPA Air Safety Foundation and FAA sent the foundation's WeatherWise CD to all instrument-rated
pilots in the United States (AOPA, 2008).



Risk perception. Accurate assessment but without correct appreciation of risks, also often identified as
pilot over-confidence (Goh and Wiegmann, 2001c).



Motivational factors. “Get-home-itus”, “sunk costs” or other personal or social errors, or corporate culture
/ operational / commercial pressures. A variant of the “sunk costs” model is the prospect theory (Kaneman
and Tversky, 1979, 1984) explanation of decision framing offered by O’Hare and Smitheram (1995).
Prospect theory offers a cognitive explanation for why decision-making is inherently riskier if framed in
terms of losses than if framed in terms of gains. Indeed, O’Hare and Smitheram found that pilots in their
decision scenario study made more conservative decisions if they framed their decision in terms of a gain
from their current position than if they framed their decision as a loss (eg, “sunk costs” such as fuel used, or
time and money spent) from their starting position (leading to risky decision-making). They recommended
that new pilots should be trained to frame their decisions to continue or divert on the basis of gains or
benefits from their current position rather than on the basis of losses or resources spent from the start of the
flight.

However, none of these models can account for the startling inconsistency between the simulator study
findings of Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2001, 2002) and O’Hare and Wiegmann (2003).
Pilots tested by Wiegman et al. (2001, 2002) flew in simulated scenarios under 5,000 foot ceilings and with
5 mile visibility until weather deteriorated over a distance of 15 miles to IMC either early or late in the flight.
Weather deterioration early in the flight led to more plan continuations than late weather deterioration, which is
contrary to the prospect theory or “sunk costs” prediction. Wiegmann et al. (2001) concluded that “VFR flight into
IMC may be due in part to poor situation assessment and experience rather than to motivational factors and risktaking behavior that increase with time and effort invested in the flight (p. 10)”.
On the other hand, O’Hare and Wiegmann (2003) presented pilots with short and long scud-running
simulator scenarios with more marginal weather, which also degraded more gradually. That is, pilots all flew (i.e.,
chose to continue) at or near their personal minima (1500 foot ceiling) for either 22 nm or 66 nm after weather
deteriorated 20 nm into their flights. O’Hare and Wiegmann found that “those who had covered the greater distance
[were] much more likely to continue with the flight than those who had only come half as far (p. 28, italics mine)”.
Their result is consistent with prospect theory and the “sunk costs” prediction.
None of the theories listed above can reconcile the contradictory findings of these two studies. However,
dissonance theory, a model from social psychology, offers a compelling explanation for the contradiction.
A Different Model: Dissonance Theory
Dissonance theory is generally considered to be the most powerful theory to come out of social psychology
within the last fifty years (Jones, 1985). This very general and powerful theory provides a compelling model for
VFR into IMC decision-making, and may inform development of effective countermeasures for those accidents.
Brehm (1956) and Festinger (1957) first proposed that a person’s actions could generate psychological discomfort,
or cognitive dissonance, which the decision-maker would then attempt to reduce. Cognitive dissonance of the type
relevant to this model is generated by the free-choice experimental paradigm, and the results have been generalized
to many real-world situations.
According to dissonance theory, making a free (and difficult) choice between alternatives generates
dissonance, due to the negative aspects of the chosen alternative, and the positive aspects of the non-chosen
alternative (ie., dissonant cognitions). Because those dissonant cognitions nearly overbalance the consonant
cognitions, the decision-maker will tend to change the balance (and reduce dissonance) either by reducing dissonant
cognitions (i.e., negative attributes of the chosen alternative and positive attributes of non-chosen alternatives), or by
adding to or accentuating consonant cognitions (i.e., positive attributes of the chosen alternative and negative
attributes of non-chosen alternatives), or both. Dissonance is thereby reduced by increasing the difference between
the chosen and the non-chosen alternative by spreading of alternatives or post-decision distortion. This spreading is
accomplished in many ways, such as by reducing the estimated probability of negative outcomes for the chosen
alternative and increasing it for the non-chosen alternative, or by forgetting non-chosen alternatives.

A favourite technique for reducing the postdecisional dissonance, according to the theory, is to change
cognitions in such a manner as to increase the attractiveness of the chosen alternative relative to the
unchosen alternative(s). (Knox and Inkster, 1968, p. 319)
Overconfidence is another dissonance reduction mechanism, although confidence of judgment is
uncorrelated with decision accuracy (Blanton et al., 2001).
Brehm and Festinger’s initial formulations allowed only for post-decision dissonance to be generated and
reduced, but more recent investigations (see Brownstein (2003) for a comprehensive review) have unequivocally
demonstrated that if one alternative is favored or preferred, pre-decision distortion may also occur, and may be up to
two times more influential than post-decision spreading of alternatives (Russo, Medvec and Meloy, 1996).
Although much discussion and argument has been generated in the field of social psychology regarding the
mechanisms underlying attitude change findings, those attitude change findings themselves, and in particular, those
involving “spreading of alternatives” between chosen and not chosen alternatives are powerful and ubiquitous.
Dissonance Theory and VFR into IMC Accidents
Dissonance theory predicts that a pilot’s successive difficult decisions to continue a flight into marginal
weather conditions rather than diverting to another airport or returning to the airport of departure, may cause
subsequent judgements of the chosen alternative (i.e., to continue the flight) to be more favourable or positive, and
judgements of the other alternative (i.e., to divert to an alternate or make a precautionary landing) to be more
negative. Therefore, decisions to continue a flight as weather worsens may well become less conservative than the
initial decision to begin the flight, leading the pilot to believe that a decision to continue a flight into marginal (or
less) weather conditions (i.e., nearly IMC) is reasonable and within his or her personal risk management limits.
Furthermore, as the flight continuation decision is revisited repeatedly, both pre-decision distortion and postdecision distortion may affect decision-making simultaneously, and finally, many small distortions may well sum to
deadly effect. Paradoxically, a pilot who revisits the continuation decision more often may generate more distortion
and make riskier weather decisions.
Flight Simulation Support for Dissonance Theory
The earlier presented contrast between Wiegman, Goh, and O’Hare (2001, 2002) and O’Hare and
Wiegmann (2003) offers the most compelling simulator study evidence for the influence of dissonance theory
mechanisms on weather decision-making. Wiegmann et al. (2001, 2002) found that late weather deterioration led to
fewer plan continuations than early weather deterioration, contrary to the predictions of the “sunk costs” theory or
the “get-home-it-is” model, and concluded that
VFR flight into IMC may be due in part to poor situation assessment and experience rather than to
motivational factors and risk-taking behavior that increase with time and effort invested in the flight.
(Wiegmann et al, 2001, p. 10)
In contrast, O’Hare and Wiegmann (2003) reported
a significant difference between those who covered the longer and shorter distance before the critical
weather change, with those who had covered the greater distance being much more likely to continue with
the flight than those who had only come half as far (p. 28, italics mine).
The critical experimental difference between the two simulator studies, and the explanation of their
opposite results, may be that pilots in the first study flew in the simulator with 5000‘ ceilings and 5 mile visibility
until weather deteriorated to IMC early or late in their flights, while in the second study, all pilots (by choice)
continued their flights when the ceiling dropped to 1500’ (at or below their personal minimums in all cases) only 20
nm into the flight, and then dropped to IMC (800’) either 22 nm or 66 nm later. That is, the pilots in the second
study incurred spreading of alternatives for either 22 nm (early IMC) or 66 nm (late IMC), causing substantially
more distortion for late IMC pilots than for early IMC pilots and making them much more likely to commit plan
continuation errors. However, all pilots in the first study flew in conditions far above their own personal minimums
until weather deteriorated to below IMC over 15 miles, giving them the same brief opportunity to be influenced by
dissonance theory mechanisms regardless of their assigned experimental condition, so that weaker factors prevailed.
Another VFR into IMC flight simulation finding also supports the dissonance theory model. Goh and
Wiegmann (2001b) found that pilots who diverted made more accurate post-decision assessments of visual
conditions than pilots who continued simulated flights into deteriorating weather, and suggested that this finding
demonstrated “errors early in the decision-making process in the form of inaccurate assessments of visibility, …

compounded by other factors such as their greater willingness to take risks, greater confidence in their flight skills,
and a reduced sense of vulnerability to weather hazards and pilot error (p. 5)”. However, the less accurate
assessments made by the continuing pilots may instead have resulted from post-decision spreading of alternatives –
that is, their initial assessments may have been equally accurate, but had become distorted by the time they were
reported to the experimenters.
Mapping Dissonance Theory onto Weather-Related Decision-Making
The action-based model of cognitive dissonance (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2002) is an excellent
fit for weather decision-making. “Spread of alternatives” is maximized by implementation of a decision (e.g., by
taking off into marginally acceptable weather). Harmon-Jones et al. state that an essential function of the spreading
of alternatives is to transform a decision into effective and unconflicted action, while noting that this may “be
maladaptive and dysfunctional … when persons maintain and bolster a commitment to a decision that clearly harms
themselves or others (p. 712)”. This concern particularly applies to pilots’ decisions regarding weather, in which the
decision involves successive judgements about changeable conditions.
Numerous characteristics of dissonance theory map closely onto weather-related decision-making in
aviation. Some aviation-related factors that may increase either the spreading of alternatives or pre-decision
distortion or both, as shown in the literature, include:


Difficulty of decision (Brehm, 1956; Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2002) – weather close to pilot’s
personal minimums makes decisions most difficult (maximizing the probability of VFR into IMC);



Immediacy of implementation (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2002) – pilots take off almost
immediately after assessing weather conditions;



Public commitment (Festinger, 1957) – pilots must communicate their decisions to ATC and passenger(s);



Importance of decision (Brownstein, Read, and Simon, 2004) – An incorrect weather-related decision can
lead to fatalities or serious injuries, and aircraft loss or damage;



Action orientation increases spreading of alternatives (Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones, 2002) – Pilots are
very action oriented:
o

a decision to take off leads to very rigorous action sequence(s);

o

continuing to implement a flight plan involves very busy and ongoing action requirements to
continue the plan;



Sequential presentation of information – increases pre-decision distortion or confirmation bias through
seeking information favorable to preference (pre-decision distortion) or to decision (post-decision cognitive dissonance “spreading of alternatives”) (Jonas et al., 2001) – Pilot information scans and actions
are sequentially organized (e.g., checklists, planning, instrument scans);



Favored alternative or “tentative preference” will tend to increase pre-decision distortion (Brownstein,
Read, and Simon, 2004; Russo, Meloy, and Medvec, 1998) – Clearly, a pilot’s favored alternative will be to
begin, continue, and complete a planned flight;



Good mood increases predecisional bias in a free choice task (Meloy, 2000) – Most pilots love to fly, and
anticipation enhances their mood.

Proposed Tests of Dissonance Theory Hypothesis
The cross-country decision-making simulation scenarios developed by O’Hare and Wiegmann (2003) could
be adapted to present the critical experimental conditions of both Wiegman, Goh, and O’Hare (2001, 2002) and
O’Hare and Wiegmann (2003), by crossing high ceiling versus scud-running with early versus late weather
deterioration to test the dissonance hypothesis that only in the scud-running conditions will pilots have a greater
tendency to continue the flight into late marginal (and worse) weather than into early marginal (and worse) weather.
Several other variables could also be manipulated to test other predictions of the dissonance theory
hypothesis, and to test the effectiveness of potential countermeasures:


Severity of weather at initial decision to depart (less marginal weather yields less dissonance, hence
reduced subsequent spreading of alternatives and reduced likelihood of continuing into weather below
minimums.)



Gradual versus sudden onset of weather deterioration (fewer decisions regarding marginal conditions
means less spreading of alternatives and reduced likelihood of continuing into weather below minimums.)



Fewer versus more decisions (termination decisions offered) controlling for flight length (more decisions
yield more opportunities to generate dissonance, thereby increasing subsequent spreading of alternatives
and the likelihood of continuing into weather below minimums.)



Pilot versus passenger perceptions (as passengers don’t make the decisions to depart or to continue the
flight, they should feel little or no dissonance, so should be more able to accurately judge weather
conditions.)

High Risk Situations and Potential Countermeasures
Given that dissonance reduction mechanisms increase the likelihood of VFR into IMC accidents, informing
pilots of relatively high-risk situations that increase the likelihood of pre-decision distortion and post-decision
spreading of alternatives, and suggesting countermeasures developed in accordance with the large body of
dissonance theory literature may reduce the incidence of VFR into IMC accidents and fatalities.
For example, more gradual onset of weather deterioration increases the number of decisions regarding
marginal weather conditions, resulting in more spreading of alternatives and distortion, and increasing the likelihood
of continuing a flight into IMC. (Indeed, a paradox of dissonance theory is that the more frequently a careful pilot
scans weather conditions in flight, the greater their risk of continuing a flight into IMC, all other things being equal.)
However, because passengers don’t normally make the decisions to depart or to continue a flight, they should feel
little or no dissonance, and may assess weather conditions more accurately. Therefore, pilots may make more
accurate decisions if they solicit and consider the opinions of knowledgeable passengers.
Because perceptual distortion of weather assessment and decision-making is gradual and progressive, the
strategy of separating a decision to divert from prior decisions to continue may offer an effective countermeasure for
distortion. For example, if an in-flight pilot asks “Would I take off into these conditions?”, or even, “Would I
recommend that an average pilot and my child or other loved one take off in these conditions?” and responds “No”,
then the most reasonable choice is likely to divert to an alternate.
Another option for reducing the influences of prior and subsequent decisions may be for a pilot to carry
pictures of weather conditions close to his or her personal weather minima, to provide an unchanging standard of
comparison. Perhaps the WeatherWise training material (Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003) could be adapted to that end.
Dissonance theory literature contains substantial additional information regarding means for reducing or
eliminating pre and post-decision distortion. For example, less biased weather decision-making may be facilitated by
asking decision-makers to justify their information choice sources, by inducing accountability for the decision
process (by auditing and evaluating that process) rather than accountability for decision outcomes, and in general, by
focusing on information rather than on a prior decision or favored alternative (Jonas et al., 2001).
Dissonance may account for some other plan continuation errors as well. In 2008, fuel management
accidents accounted for 73 non-commercial fixed-wing accidents, 9 of them fatal (AOPA 2009). Although accidents
of this type have decreased by 50% over the last ten years, some still occur in part from “failure … to make timely
decisions to divert for fuel in the face of changing circumstances. (ibid, p. 14)”.
Conclusion
Research is needed to determine if many weather decision-making errors and accidents, and perhaps other
plan continuation errors, result from an active, ubiquitous and powerful characteristic of human cognition that tends
to bias even the most conscientious pilots toward distorted situation assessment and risky decision-making. If so,
research is also needed to inform the development of effective tools and training to further reduce the number of
VFR into IMC accidents, and perhaps the number of fuel management accidents as well.
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